

# Formalizing an Efficient Runtime Assertion Checker for an Arithmetic Language with Functions and Predicates

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


# RAC of Arithmetic in E-ACSL


# Base Principle for Inline Monitoring

C with  
Logical Annotations


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
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`+, *, -, /`

- Conditionals

`p ? t1 : t2`

- User-defined Functions and Predicates

`logic integer f (integer x) = t      ...      f(y)`

`predicate p (integer x) = b      ...      p(y)`

## Correctness vs. Efficiency

## Arithmetic Overflow Issues

Naive Approach :

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1 // x is an int
2 //@ assert (x+1 == 0);

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$2^{31} == 0$

false

Arithmetic Overflow

Undefined Behavior

## Solution : Arbitrary Precision Arithmetic

A correct translation generated using the GMP library :

```

1 // x is an int
2 //@ assert (x+1 == 0);

1 // x is an int
2 mpz_t y, z, o, r;
3 mpz_init_set_si(y, x);
4 mpz_init_set_si(o, 1);
5 mpz_init(r);
6 mpz_add(r, y, o);
7 mpz_init_set_si(z, 0);
8 int c = mpz_cmp(r, 0);
9 assert (c == 0);
10 mpz_clear(y);
11 mpz_clear(z);
12 mpz_clear(o);
13 mpz_clear(r);
  
```

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- $\mathcal{I}(t)$  is contained in the integers representable by machine  
Can safely use machine integers
- Otherwise  
Use GMP integers in case there is an overflow



# The Problem With Functions

## Translating Functions

- Generate a C function that translate the ACSL function

```
1 logic integer p (integer x) = x + 1000000000;
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1 int p (int x) {x + 1000000000;}
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- Same issue with arithmetic overflows

```
1 /*@ assert p(1) == 1000000001; */ //OK
2 /*@ assert p(5000000000) > 0; */ //Not OK
3 /*@ assert p(2000000000) > 0; */ //Not OK
```

## One Function Per Call-Site

- Generate a different C function for each call-site

```
1 /*@ assert p(1) == 1000000001; */ // -> p_1
2 /*@ assert p(5000000000) > 0; */ // -> p_2
3 /*@ assert p(20000000000) > 0; */ // -> p_3
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- Code duplication

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1 /*@ assert p(1) == p(1); */ //Generate the
    same function twice!
    
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- Issues :

- Code duplication

```

1 /*@ assert p(1) == p(1); */ //Generate the
    same function twice!
    
```

- Unclear for recursive functions

```

1 /*@ logic integer f (integer x) =
2     x >= 5000000000 ? 0 : f(x + 1) + 1 */
3 ...
4 //@ assert f(0) = 5000000000 // the
    recursive call escapes the type int
    
```

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A call context is the data of the interval  $\mathcal{I}(t)$  for every argument of the function



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- Conservative in reuse of function

```

1 /*@ assert p(1) == p(1); */ //reuse the
   function
2 /*@ assert p(2) != p(1); */ //one new
   function
    
```

## Dealing With Recursion

### Assumption

*The oracle  $\mathcal{I}$  gives an interval adapted to recursive functions*

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For instance :

```

1 /*@ logic integer f (integer x) =
2     x >= 5000000000 ? 1 : f(x + 1) + 1 */
3 // -> interval for x+1: [1..5000000001]
4 ...
5 /*@ assert f(0) = 5000000000
6 // -> interval for 0: [0..5000000000]
```

# Functional Correctness

## A Complex Translation

- Starting from simple idea, the translation became non-trivial
  - Complex code using GMP
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- How to ensure the translation is correct ?

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Example :

```

 $\mathbb{Z}$ _assgn( $\tau_z$ ,  $v$ ,  $z$ ) :=
  MATCH  $\tau_z$  WITH :
    CASE int :
       $v = z$ ;
    CASE mpz :
      mpz_set_string( $v$ , "z");
    
```

# Assumptions

There exists a semantics the language we consider (see article) :  
C programs, ACSL annotations, GMP library calls

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### Assumption

*The inference given is sound : All possible semantics of  $t$  belong to  $\mathcal{I}(t)$*

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## Theorem

*The translation of the subset of ACSL to the subset of C with calls to GMP library that we have defined preserves the semantics.*

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Avoid combinatorial blowup by proving the functional correctness of the macros independently!

## What's Next?

- Formalize and prove the oracle  $\mathcal{I}$   
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- Study interaction between memory properties [5] and arithmetic ones

Thank you

## References I

- [1] P. Baudin et al. “The Dogged Pursuit of Bug-Free C Programs : The Frama-C Software Analysis Platform”. In : *Communications of the ACM* (2021).
- [2] P. Baudin et al. *ACSL : ANSI/ISO C Specification Language*. Rapp. tech. CEA List et Inria. url : <https://frama-c.com/download/acsl.pdf>.
- [3] J. Signoles. *E-ACSL Version 1.18. Implementation in Frama-C Plug-in E-ACSL 26.1*. <http://frama-c.com/download/e-acsl/e-acsl-implementation.pdf>. 2022.
- [4] N. Kosmatov, F. Maurica et J. Signoles. “Efficient Runtime Assertion Checking for Properties over Mathematical Numbers”. In : *International Conference on Runtime Verification (RV)*. 2020.

## References II

- [5] D. Ly et al. “Verified Runtime Assertion Checking for Memory Properties”. In : *International Conference on Tests and Proofs (TAP)*. 2020.